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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the cold war, Africa has been host to an inordinate
number of internal deadly conflicts. At no other time in contemporary African
history have the masses of African people been forced to live amidst the
violence and carnage that has manifested in the post cold war era. These
phenomena have been exacerbated by systemic political and economic
disengagement of Western states from Africa due to the devaluation of it's geopolitical stock. Hence, African states appear to be attempting to re-assert
themselves as national, sub-regional, regional and even international power
brokers in order to obtain or sustain legitimacy in the "new continental" and
global order. This power brokering has created complex security dilemmas that
have affected the internal and external balances of power in and amongst states.
Both authoritarian and democratic regimes have endured internal and external
military challenges to their authority. In addition, they have had immense and
counterproductive pressures bestowed upon them by coercive international
financial institutions. These circumstances have worked together to spawn and
exacerbate deadly conflict. As a result, African leaders have been forced to
originate and implement indigenous formulas to establish the necessary
mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflict.'
African states, in particular West African regimes, have demonstrated
their commitment to build sustainable peace by proffering and securing African
solutions to African problems. This point is best evidenced by the relative

* Attorney at Law, Ph.D. candidate, University of Cambridge-St. John's College;
Doctor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School.
' The Organization of African Unity, "Resolving Conflicts in Africa Implementation
Options," OAU Information Services Publication Series II (1993), p. 1.
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success of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in Liberia (1990) and
Sierra Leone (1997); Nigeria's popular intervention in Sierra Leone (1997); the
Mission for the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB) in the
Central African Republic (1997); Senegal and Guinea's interventions in GuineaBissau (1998); and South Africa's intervention in Lesotho (1998).2 All of the
above mentioned interventions were carried out without the authorisation of the
United Nations Security Council and transpired between 1990 and 1998, the
latter four taking place between 1997 and 1998. Notwithstanding, each mission
had a distinctly different outcome, which I argue can be explained by
qualitatively assessing the degree of trust-building that took place prior to each
intervention.
This article is concerned with examining the dynamics of trust-building
in a pre-intervention context.' Specifically, it will analyse the concept of trustbuilding prior to the ECOWAS humanitarian interventions in Liberia and Sierra
Leone,4 although the general thrust of my argument will no doubt apply to
other African interventions.' Humanitarian intervention can be taken to mean:
Intervention in a state involving the use of force (U.N. action in Iraq and
Somalia or ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone) or threat of force
(U.N. action in Haiti), where the intervenor deploys armed forces and, at the
least, makes clear that it is willing to use force if its operation is resisted-as it
attempts to alleviate conditions in which a substantial part of the population of

2 Moreover, the establishment of the African Court on Human and People's Rights in
1998 gives further prowess to this contention.
This would be after the decision to deploy forces has been made, but before forces
are actually deployed.
A humanitarian intervention is one that is not authorised by the United Nations
Security Council, and hence, in legal as opposed to operational terms, is unilateral.
s My analysis is only concerned with examining the concept of trust-building prior to
the deployment of armed forces in internal conflicts. I concentrate on humanitarian intervention
as opposed to traditional peace-keeping since, as indicated (in fn.6 below) international law and
U.N. law provide for what appear to be pre-intervention trust-building measures with respect to
the latter.
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a state is threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale.' Within this
context, trust-building should be seen as the pre-intervention political processes
that seek to demonstrate, assess and verify the predictability of behaviour of all
parties to a given conflict, and forecast the consequences of that behaviour with
respect to political outcomes (the probability that an intervention will
succeed)? In this sense, a viable pre-intervention trust-building scheme should
seek to proffer all parties to a conflict, including the de jure government,
factional leaders, civilian populace and humanitarian enforcers (herein relevant
parties), a transparent and detailed overview of the political, legal and
operational significance and ramifications of intervention. This does not
necessarily mean that trust will emanate amongst the relevant parties by
following this approach, nor that the conflicting parties would favour or support
intervention if this method were followed, but only that they may attain a
confident expectation that the intended operation is not ill-intended nor
illegitimate. Simply stated, my thesis is as follows: Pre-intervention trustbuilding can determine post-intervention operational outcomes and the extent
to which a humanitarian enforcement operation may succeed.' Hence, I argue
that the primary reason why the Liberian mission encountered many more
problems than the one in Sierra Leone is due in part to the degree of preintervention trust-building that took place.
The mission led by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad,
U.S.-led U.N. intervention in Somalia and U.N. intervention in Yugoslavia are
prime examples of peace-enforcement missions that to a large extent failed due

6 Portions of this defmition were extracted from Christopher Greenwood's definition
of humanitarian intervention. Christopher Greenwood, "Is There a Right to Humanitarian

Intervention?," The World Today, Vol. 49 (February 1993), p. 34. Hence, the standard preintervention "peace-keeping" criteria, which requires that, there exist a cease-fire, all parties to
a conflict consent to intervention and that force is only used in self-defence, are not applicable
to my analysis, as they are not elements of the doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention.
According to Morton Deutsch, trust can be defined as consisting of two elements: (a)
predictability of another's behaviour and (b) the positive or negative consequences of that
behaviour for oneself. Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
2 (1958), pp. 265-279. See also, Ralph M. Goldman and Willard M. Hardman, Building Trust:
An Introduction to Peace-keeping and Arms Control, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), p. 4.
8 'The terms humanitarian enforcement and peace-enforcement are used interchangeably.
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to a lack of pre-intervention trust-building. However, this does not mean that
a humanitarian enforcement operation that includes a comprehensive trustbuilding component will not encounter difficulties or perhaps fail, but only that
historic records show the likelihood of success is much greater when states
engage in pre-intervention trust-building.

TRUST-BUILDING
Trust- building should be the first process of any viable preventive
diplomacy plan and hence falls within the rubric of conflict prevention. In this
context, pre-intervention trust-building should be seen as a latter phase of
conflict prevention because it is a political process, which precedes the use of
military force and seeks to avert or reduce post-deployment operational failure.
"In this respect, it is much like preventive medicine, the purpose of which is
to prevent illness before it occurs."' I argue that trust-building processes should
precede confidence-building and peace-building measures with respect to any
humanitarian intervention scheme; confidence-building being a definitive
feature of conflict management or containment and post conflict peace-building
being a significant component of conflict resolution (see Exhibit 1 below).1°
Stated differently, pre-intervention trust-building should be the first phase of
any comprehensive conflict reduction system that entails the use of military
force.

9 Mohammed Bedjaoui, "Preventive Diplomacy: Development, Education and Human
Rights," in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. ed., Preventive Diplomacy (New York, NY: Basic Books for
the Center for International Health and Cooperation, 1996).
1° It is beyond the scope of this article to explicate the very ambiguous and overlapping
concepts of confidence-building and peace-building. For informative works on these concepts
see, Fen Osler Hampson, "Can Peacebuilding Work?," Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.
30, No. 3 (1997); James Sutterlin, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International
Security: A Challenge to be Met (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), chapters 4 and 5.
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Exhibit 1
Phases of Conflict Reduction
Stages

1

Political Processes

Operational
Objectives

Political Objectives

Pre-Intervention
Trust-building

Promoting Trust

Conflict Prevention

2

=

Confidence-building

Establishing Order

Conflict Management

3

=

Post Conflict Peacebuilding

Maintenance of Order

Conflict Resolution

The concept of peace-enforcement is a trust-promoting activity itself,
however, the process of carrying out an enforcement operation necessitates that
pre-intervention trust-building takes place. As previously stated, the absence of
coherent pre-intervention trust-building leads to operational tragedies of the
type witnessed in Chad, Somalia and Yugoslavia. Trust-building measures
should be initiated amongst all parties that have a vested interest in a conflict,
including the intervenors, host state government, factional leaders and, when
possible, the civilian populace of the target state. Interventionist states should
work diligently to develop institutional trust before undertaking humanitarian
enforcement activities. Institutional trust has been defined as the attitude of
trust that results from and is reinforced by the predictable behaviour of the
members of an institution, in this case the member states of ECOWAS." In
this context, trust may be promoted when political institutions work to make
the conduct of conflicting parties "predictable and facilitate [relations]
transactions among members from which they [both] derive positive
consequences, that is, satisfactions and a 'sense of profie."12 This point is
particularly important in the African context where distrust and political

11

12

Goldman and Hardman, supra note 7.
Goldman and Hardman, p. 265 (emphasis added).
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disillusionment play a major role in the stimulation and exacerbation of
conflict. The discussion below will explore several ways to promote trust by
building and enhancing mechanisms for pre-intervention cooperation and
organisation, and the effective deployment of contingents for peace enforcement
operations.
The basis of my analysis with regard to how interventionist states may
promote trust is based on four key principles: legitimacy, resource capacity,
sub-regional doctrine formulation and transparency.13
First, interventionist states should ensure that a proposed intervention
is legitimate under either U.N. law or customary international law. Once the
decision to intervene has been made, and prior to intervention, the intervenors
should prepare and deliver a legally coherent policy statement on the validity
of intervention to the relevant parties to a conflict. This, for example, would
appear to be a progressive way to stimulate dialog between warring factions
and the intervenors, or provoke discourse amongst factions that have broken a
cease-fire agreement or suspended negotiations.
Second, interventionist states should insure that resources exist to
complete the proposed operation before troop deployment. A resource-starved
operation may contribute to the exacerbation rather than the aversion of
conflict, and frustrate future peacemaking efforts. When contingents are
deployed into hostile surroundings, states put them at severe risk of injury or
death by not providing them with the necessary equipment to effectively carry
out their mission.
Third, African states need to fashion African approaches or methods to
deal with the dynamics of African conflict scenarios. This may include
formulating an African peacekeeping doctrine by "drawing up standard
operating procedures to take account of the purely African dimension in
preparations and orientation of troops for a peace-keeping mission."' States

13 Transparency is an interdependent as opposed to a separate principle that gives
viability to each of the other principles.
14 Informal Paper on Conflict Prevention and Peace-Keeping in Africa, submitted to
the Secretary-General on the United Nations by HE Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari, Permanent
Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, and HE Sir David Hannay, GCMG Permanent
Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, April 11, 1995.
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should seek to formulate and regularly revise such doctrines according to their
sub-regional experiences. This would allow all parties to a conflict to
confidently forecast the methods interventionist states would likely employ to
forestall conflict. In this sense, the threat of forcible intervention may become
a calculated consideration of warring factions and hence serve as a deterrent to
continued conflict. Likewise, it could discourage opposition groups (including
segments of a military) from attempting to carry out a coup d' etat.
Finally, transparency is an interdependent principle that gives viability
to each of the above principles. For example, interventionist states should
conduct pre-intervention technical survey missions in a target state in which
detailed operational plans, including an assessment of resource requirements are
formulated.' Moreover, such states should coordinate the dissemination of
information with regard to the basic objectives of the intervention to the
relevant parties-without of course jeopardising the object and purpose of the
mission. This would increase transparency and decrease the likelihood that the
expectations of parties would not be fulfilled. As a result, the mission would
have greater legitimacy from the relevant parties.

BACKGROUND
In the following section, we will discuss the pre-intervention
circumstances that led to the ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
The ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was the first of its
kind. It was the first time that the international community as a whole
supported military intervention by a regional actor in a state without prior
authorisation from the U.N. Security Council. Furthermore, it marked the first
time that the U.N. co-deployed a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
(UNOMIL) with a peace enforcement mission already underway. The
ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone marked the second time that
both of these phenomena occurred. Hence, it is clear that the Liberian
intervention served as a precedent for the one in Sierra Leone.

15

Gambari and Hannay
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Applying the logic of "critical juncture" as employed by Leonardo
Villa lon and Phillip Huxtable,' the ECOWAS' decision to unilaterally
intervene in the internal conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have demarcated
a period of significant change in African attitudes toward enforcing the peace,
which has left a distinct legacy. The missions have no doubt served as
precedents for the other African interventions. Further, with the advent of this
critical juncture, absolute compliance with respect to the "non-derogable"
international law principles of non-interference and territorial integrity have, on
several occasions, been compromised in the spirit of humanitarianism and
regional security. African states appear to have accepted by way of practice a
norm permitting exceptions to the once rigid OAU Charter prohibitions against
non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and infringing upon the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.17 The post-1990 unilateral
interventions by ECOWAS-ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria in
Sierra Leone, MISAB in the Central African Republic, Senegal in GuineaBissau and South Africa in Lesotho evidence this fact. These cases demonstrate
that a shift in customary international law, or, at the least, African continental
law has taken place.
Despite the precedent that has been set by the ECOWAS, as previously
mentioned, the Liberian and Sierra Leone missions had starkly different degrees
of success. Neither intervention can be considered as an absolute operational
success; however, it is necessary to explain why the Liberian mission
encountered many more difficulties than the one in Sierra Leone. I attribute
these different outcomes to the degree of pre-intervention trust-building that
took place prior to each intervention.

16 Leonardo A. Villalon and Phillip A. Huxtable ed., The African State at a Critical
Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1998).
17 The Organization of African Unity, "OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure," Article
III (2)(3) (Addis Ababa: OAU General Secretariat Information Service, August 1992).
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Liberia

The Liberian Civil War began on December 24, 1989, when Charles
Taylor," Liberia's current President,19 and a group of so called 'dissidents'
launched a small-scale attack on security personnel in Nimba County (located
on the Liberian-Cote d'Ivoire border), and advanced toward Monrovia with the
sole purpose of overthrowing President Samuel K. Doe's Autocracy.2° The
group led by Taylor came to be known as the National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL). The NPFL grew quickly, as politically disillusioned members
of the Mano and Gio ethnic groups joined 21 NPFL fighters systematically
defeated Doe's American- and Nigerian-backed regime, known for its violent
and repressive military tactics. As a result, by May 1990, with the exception
of Monrovia,22 Taylor's NPFL controlled more territory in Liberia than Doe's
regime. Max Sesay reports that "within six months of the outbreak of the war
[by May]...Taylor had already captured over 90 percent of the country."' At
this stage, it is clear that Taylor was the only de facto authority in the

Republic.
Doe, facing certain defeat, made unsuccessful appeals for assistance to
the people of Liberia and U.S. government. Disgruntled and impaired by the

18 Former Liberian Director-General of the General Services Agency (GSA) under
Samuel K. Doe's regime who, after having been charged with embezzlement in Liberia, fled to
the United States, only to be arrested in Massachusetts. While awaiting extradition to Liberia,
he escaped from jail. Unpublished document, Baffour Ankomah (Deputy Chief Editor, New
African), Interview with Charles Taylor (Gbarnga, Liberia, July 30, 1992) pp. 1-17.
19 President Charles Taylor was inaugurated on August 2, 1997. United Nations, Final
Report of the Secretary-General On The United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia,
S/1997/712, September 12, 1997.
2° Marc Weller, ed., "BBC Monitoring Report, 4 January 1990, Liberia: Curfew in
Nimba County Following Alleged Coup, 2 January 1990," in Regional Peace-keeping and
International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
pp. 32-33.
21 Weller, supra note 20 at xix. Taylor's NPFL included members from nearly every
ethnic group in Liberia.
22 Monrovia is the capital of Liberia; it was named after U.S. President James Monroe.
23 Max Sesay, "Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia," Review of African
Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996), p. 37 (emphasis added).
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collapse of his regime, dissolution of his military and the impending state of
anarchy in the country, Doe appealed to ECOWAS to introduce a "[p]eacekeeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension.... ry24
Since ECOWAS and the OAU were not able to mediate a peaceful end
to the conflict,' on August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation
Committee (SMC),26 created the ECOMOG for Liberia.' ECOWAS created
ECOMOG to halt the "wanton destruction of human life and
property...[and]...massive damage...being caused by the armed conflict to the
stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation."' ECOMOG was
mandated to "restore law and order to create the necessary conditions for free
and fair elections...."' On August 24, 1990, ECOMOG forces landed in
Liberia, and immediately came under attack by NPFL forces?' In response,
ECOMOG forces "fought back with mortars, artillery and automatic
weapons."' Hence, it is easy to understand why Taylor viewed ECOMOG as
an occupying force and foreign combatant.

'

Weller, "Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members

of the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 14 July 1990," supra
note 20, p. 60.
25 Weller, supra note 20, pp. 38-9, 57-9, 63, 65.
26 Weller, "ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Decision
A/DEC.9/5/90, Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul
Republic of Gambia, 30 May 1990," supra note 20, p. 38.
27 Weller, "ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, on the
Cease-fire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, Banjul,
Republic of Gambia, 7 August 1990," supra note 20, pp. 67, 71. The ECOWAS Standing
Mediation Committee included representatives from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Mali and Togo.
Weller, supra note 27, p. 67 (word replaced).
29 Weller, "ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, on the
Cease-fire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, Banjul,
Republic of Gambia, 7 August 1990," supra note 20, p. 68.
30 Weller, "BBC Monitoring Report, 27 August 1990, Report: ECOMOG Force Lands;
Met by Prince Johnson; Clash with NPFL, 24 August 1990," supra note 20, p. 87.
31 Id.
Troops from Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Mali, Sierra Leone and Guinea
participated in the intervention. See, "Mediation Committee Meets (Banjul)," Africa Research
Bulletin, (August, 1-30, 1990), p. 9802.
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Sierra Leone

In February and March of 1996, in the midst of a civil war, Sierra
Leone held its first parliamentary and presidential elections in thirty years.32
As a result, the Sierra Leone People's Party led by President Ahmed Tijan
Kabbah came into power.' In spite of the election, fighting continued
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF), who contested the election. On November 30, 1996, the Government
of Cote d'Ivoire, ECOWAS,34 the United Nations, OAU and the
Commonwealth States facilitated peace talks, which culminated in the Abidjan
Accord, ending the civil war.
On May 25, 1997, approximately six months after the war, several
junior military officers led by Major Johnny Koromah successfully overthrew
the democratically elected government of President Kabbah, forcing him to flee
to Guinea.35

32 The election followed five years of civil war between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). During the war, Sierra Leone's Military Force
(RSLMF), traditionally used for external defence, the national police force and civil defence
militias (Kamajors) provided internal security. The Nigerian and Guinean militaries supported
the RSLMF. The government also employed Executive Outcomes, a private South African
mercenary firm. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone, S/1997/80,
January 26, 1997. ECOWAS, the OAU, the U.N. and numerous non-governmental organisations
were involved in setting the stage for the elections. African Research Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 6,
p. 12733, June 1-30, 1997; African Research Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 5, p. 12694, May 1-31, 1997;
"West Africa," A Coup in Freetown, June 2-8, 1997, p. 887; "ECOWAS Intervenes to Restore
Democracy," Africa Today: Voice of the Continent, Vol. 3, No. 4 July/August 1997, p. 24; and
U.S. Department of State, Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, January 30, 1997.
33 United Nations, supra note 32.
34 It is important to note that prior to and during the war in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS
maintained a military base there for peace enforcement activities in Liberia.
35 President Kabbah believes that the military junta seized power in order to profit from
the country's rich supply of diamonds and gold. He accused the Revolutionary United Front of
deceiving the regular army into staging the coup. Panafrican News Agency, "Kabbah Urges
ECOWAS Leaders to Restore Him to Power," September 2, 1997.
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However, before fleeing, President Kabbah officially requested that
Nigeria and ECOWAS intervene to restore him to power?'
During the coup d' etat, in order to prevent a counteroffensive by the
Nigerian Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG) and ECOMOG, Koromah's forces
tactically attacked both contingents?' The coup appears to have been
successful due to complicity by NIFAG officers who unintentionally leaked
information revealing when there would be a change of NIFAG guard units
with other units stationed on the outskirts of Monrovia, Liberia.
The coup was condemned by the whole of the international
community." For example, during the OAU Council of Ministers' Sixty-sixth
Ordinary Session in Harare, Zimbabwe in May 1997, the Council decided that
it "[s]trongly and unequivocally condemns, the coup d' etat ... and calls for the
immediate restoration of constitutional order [and] appeals to the leaders of
ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order
to the country... "39
Soon after the coup, and pursuant to its obligations under the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Republic of Nigeria (not ECOWAS) sent
additional NIFAG troops to Sierra Leone to restore law and order.' NIFAG
was met with strong resistance from the junta and RUF, and was forced to

36 African Research Bulletin, supra note 32, Vol. 34, No. 5, p. 12695; see also
Panafrican News Agency, "Kabbah Urges ECOWAS Leaders to Restore Him to Power,"
September 2, 1997.
37 The Nigerian Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG) was created pursuant to the Status
of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Nigeria and Sierra Leone. SOFA is essentially a
defence pact between the two countries under which Nigeria provides military and security
support to Sierra Leone. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), "Between the Government of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria and The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone Concerning
the Provision of Military and Security Assistance to the Republic of Sierra Leone," Lagos,
Nigeria, March 7, 1997. Africa Today, supra note 32, p. 24; African Research Bulletin, supra
note 32, Vol. 34, No. 5, p. 12694.
38 See, U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement, "U.S.
Reaction to Coup in Sierra Leone," May 26, 1997; United Nations, "Statement by the President
of the Security Council on Sierra Leone," S/PRST/1997/29, May 27, 1997.
39 Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session,
May 28-30, 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe, "Draft Decisions," CM/Draft/Dec. (LXVI) Rev. 1, p. 14
(emphasis added).
4° African Research Bulletin, supra note 32, Vol. 34, No. 6, p. 12734.
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retreat. On August 30, 1997, during the 20th Summit Meeting of ECOWAS
Heads of State and Government in Abuja, Nigeria, ECOWAS "officially"
mandated ECOMOG to enforce sanctions against the junta and restore law and
order to Sierra Leone.' Similar to Taylor's NPFL, the junta and RUF viewed
the situation as a purely internal affair and therefore scorned foreign
intervention. However, unlike the NPFL, the latter were clearly aware that
ECOWAS had a valid basis for intervention.
Liberia and Sierra Leone share a common history.42 The post-cold-war
era did not change this reality, as both countries have suffered from perpetual
warfare and economic stagnation, having been stifled by serious rebel
movements, coup d' etats, state collapse and anarchy, not to mention the grand
human suffering that the civilian populations of both states have been forced
to endure. In light of the above, it is important to determine why the ECOMOG
intervention in Liberia was less successful than the one in Sierra Leone.
Considering the fact that both states have had to face different international and
macroeconomic realities, which have no doubt affected the nature of the
interventions, the most definitive factor in this context has been the degree of
pre-intervention trust-building that took place prior to the intervention.

PRE-INTERVENTION TRUST-BUILDING AND
THE CASE OF LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE
The following section will examine the proposed pre-intervention
principles of legitimacy, resource capacity, sub-regional doctrine formulation

4IPanafrican News Agency, "Tougher Measures Against Junta in Freetown," September
2, 1997. However, in early August 1997, pursuant to requests by ECOWAS member states, the
late Nigerian Head of State and ECOWAS Chairman General Sani Abacha appears to have
issued an "executive directive" authorising an economic blockade against Sierra Leone to be

enforced by ECOMOG.
42 Christopher Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone: An Essay in Comparative Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
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and transparency in light of the ECOWAS humanitarian interventions in Liberia
and Sierra Leone."
A.

Legitimacy

The primary reason why the ECOWAS SMC and ECOMOG failed to bring
about a cessation of conflict in Liberia was because the mission lacked
legitimacy from the major party to the conflict, Charles Taylor's NPFL. Taylor
opposed the ECOWAS scheme for two primary reasons. First, the ECOWAS
SMC did not clearly articulate the basis for intervention or proffer a specific
plan that explicated the politico-military aims of the mission, which led Taylor
to question the authenticity of the ECOMOG operation. Second, he did not
trust former Nigerian Head of State General Ibrahim Banbagida, due to the
latter's close relationship with President Doe. From this background, it is
evident that the ECOMOG mission was launched despite the fact that trust did
not exist between the peace-enforcer (ECOMOG) and the primary combatant
(Taylor's NPFL).
Disagreement as to the legality of the ECOWAS-ECOMOG
intervention in Liberia can be largely attributed to the fact that it failed to
clearly specify the legal basis for and delineate the objectives of the
intervention. This is an important point because neither the ECOWAS Treaty
of 1975, Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978), nor the Protocol Relating to
Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981), permitted the ECOWAS to intervene in
the purely internal affairs of its member states. More important, however, the
U.N. Charter forbids states to intervene in the domestic affairs of states,' and

This article will not include an analysis of the legality of the interventions with
regard to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as I have thoroughly dealt with this issue
elsewhere. See, Jeremy Levitt, "Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal
Conflicts: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone," Temple International and
Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 1998). Likewise, for a seminal article on the
legality of the Liberian intervention see Max Sesay, "Civil War and Collective Intervention in
Liberia," Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996), pp. 35-52.
44 U.N. Charter Article 2(4).
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to employ force without prior authorisation from the U.N. Security Council.45
Perhaps, the ECOWAS' failure to proffer a basis for intervention was because
its leaders simply did know how best to justify it in light of the above
mentioned legal limitations. This is not an illogical conclusion given the fact
that it was a case of first impression.
From an operational standpoint, the ECOWAS did not conduct a
technical or logistical survey mission prior to intervention, to enable it to
forecast and prepare for what eventually transpired on the ground. As a result,
the ECOMOG was ill prepared to deal with Taylor's forces upon landing,
which forced it to take on an offensive character.' This again deligitimised the
mission in the eyes of the combatants and some of the member states of

ECOWAS.
The ECOWAS' failure to clearly communicate the legal as opposed to
the moral basis for intervention appears to have been one reason why Taylor
objected to the mission. He was correctly under the assumption that under
international law the Liberian conflict was an internal one, and that any
intervention would be in violation of it's territorial integrity and the masses'
right to self-determination. However, he was unaware that the member states
of ECOWAS were entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian intervention due
to the degree of carnage that ensued with the collapse of the state. This does
not infer that Taylor would have favoured intervention had he been informed
of its legal basis, but only that a coherent communication detailing the basis for
and politico-military objectives of the mission, may have given him a confident
expectation that the intended operation was not ill-intended or illegitimate.
Likewise, the ECOWAS may have been able to earn Taylor's trust had the

U.N. Charter Article 39.
David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in
Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, ed. by Lori Fisler Damrosch
(Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 167-9.
45

46
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SMC's pre-intervention trust-building framework for the resolution of interstate
conflict been applicable in internal conflict scenarios.'
Taylor's disdain for and distrust of Nigerian Head of State General
Banbagida stems from the extensive military assistance the latter provided Doe
prior to intervention, and because he and Doe were friends." On this point
Sesay asserts that, "General Babangida was known to be a close friend of Doe.
Before the war, Nigeria's financial support to the University of Liberia led to
the naming of the Graduate School of International Relations after the Nigerian
leader," and "Nigerian military assistance to Doe after the outbreak of fighting
[but before intervention] were known in most circles, matters for which Nigeria
was constantly pilloried by Charles Taylor."° As a result, Taylor did not
believe that Babagida and hence the Nigerian military could objectively enforce
the peace.
In addition, there was a great deal of mistrust among the SMC member
states, and states contributing to ECOMOG.5° This was partly due to preexisting, post-colonial Anglophone-Francophone tensions, as the majority of
ECOMOG troops were from English-speaking countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra

47 Weller,
"ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Decision
A/DEC.9/5/90, Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee," Banjul
Republic of Gambia, May 30, 1990, supra note 20, p. 38. The decision "provides a system in
which a member-state involved in a dispute or conflict could inform the Executive Secretary of
the ECOWAS in writing of its intention to refer the matter to the SMC for settlement. Id. art.
2. The Executive Secretary then advises the Chairman of the AHSG and the governments of the
other members of the SMC about the dispute, and takes measures to help the SMC in settling
the conflict. Id. art. 3(1). The framework requires the AHSG Chairman to inform the memberstates involved in the conflict of the intention of the SMC to mediate their dispute. Id. The AHSG
Chairman must also report to the AHSG about the nature of the dispute, the parties involved, and
the SMC's mediation efforts. Id. art. 4." Kofi Oteng Kufuor, "Developments in the Resolution
of the Liberian Conflict," American University Journal ofInternational Law and Policy, Vol. 10,
No. 1 (1994-95), fn. 16 (italics added).
48 Wippman, supra note 46, p. 191.
49 Sesay, supra note 23, p. 45.
50
Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," in
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. LynnJones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 406-7.
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Leone and Gambia)." Further, the Francophone member states of ECOWAS,
namely C6te d'Ivoire and Guinea "accused ECOMOG of being a force with a
purpose only to foster the hegemonic interest of particular states."52 This view
was exacerbated because at the time, approximately 70 percent of the troops
that were to take part in the ECOMOG were Nigerian,' which, according to
the Francophone states and Taylor, would give Nigeria unwavering influence
over the mission. Further, inter-ECOWAS conflict was also provoked by
several Francophone ECOWAS states, namely Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire,
as they provided military assistance to Taylor before and after the SMC and
ECOMOG were established.' Therefore, some of the ECOWAS member
states played dual roles as peace-enforcers and parties to the conflict. Taken
together, Taylor's fact-driven suspicion of Nigeria, and ECOWAS' internal
fighting culminated in an era of distrust. These events explain why Taylor so
vehemently objected to intervention, and demonstrate that his distrust directly
impacted the effectiveness of the intervention.
The ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone was for the
most part successful. The success of the mission can be attributed to the preintervention trust-building mechanisms that ECOWAS instituted in wake of the
Liberian experience. These measures guaranteed that the mission would have
a certain degree of legitimacy.
In 1993, the ECOWAS adopted a revised treaty,' which provided for
a de jure mechanism for collective security that was not included in the original
treaty. According to Article 58 of the treaty, "member states undertake to work
to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace,
stability and security within the region" and pledge to "co-operate with the
Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the

51 Ibrahim A. Gambari, "The Role of Foreign Intervention in African Reconstruction,"
in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. by I.
William Zartman (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 230.
52 Gambari.
53 Howe, supra note 50, p. 406.
54 Howe, p. 407.
55 Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty, Article 58 (July 24,

1993).
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timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-State conflict... "56
Likewise, the article calls on member states to "establish a regional peace and
security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate."57
Hence, three years after the Liberian intervention in 1990, and four years before
the Sierra Leone mission in 1997, ECOWAS established a permanent
mechanism that obligated it to take enforcement action to resolve internal
conflicts. As a result, Article 58 conferred unambiguous legitimacy to the Sierra
Leone mission, which was not enjoyed during the Liberian intervention.
The mission was also legitimate because President Kabbah consented
to it and the international community at large, including the OAU,58 U.N. and
U.S. supported intervention.' Under international law, Kabbah's request was
sufficient enough to justify intervention since he was still recognised as the de
jure head of state by the international community, and because his regime did
not at any time lose de facto control of the state."' According to Louise
Doswald Beck, the 'existence of de facto control is generally the most
important criterion in dealing with a regime as representing the state.'61 Hence,
by the time ECOWAS made the decision to intervene in Liberia, Doe's regime
had lost de jure recognition by the international community, and was not in de
facto control of the state; from Taylor's perspective, these factors deligitimised
the ECOWAS mission. ECOWAS should have obtained Taylor's consent prior
to intervention because he was in de facto control of the state. Consequently,
since Koromah's junta was not internationally recognised and because it never
obtained de facto control of the state, it did not at any time obtain international

ECWAS Revised Treaty, Article 58 (italics added).
ECWAS Revised Treaty, Article 58 (italics added).
58 Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session,
May 28-30, 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe, Draft Decisions, CM/Draft/Dec. (LXVI) Rev. 1, p. 14.
59 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/29,
May 27, 1997; see also, U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement,
"U.S. Reaction to Coup in Sierra Leone," May 26, 1997.
" Louise Doswald-Beck, "The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of
the Government," in The British Yearbook of nternational Law, (LVI 1985), pp. 195-6. See also,
Jeremy Levitt, supra note 43.
61 Louise Doswald-Beck, p. 194.
56
57
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legal personality, as did Taylor's NPFL. This may explain why ECOWAS did
not deem it legally necessary to obtain Koromah's consent prior to intervention.
Moreover, it appears that the ECOWAS did not need to offer a justification for
the intervention because "on [May] 27th a Nigerian frigate docked and began
unloading troops at Freetown port with the permission of the country's new
rulers."" Nevertheless, as formerly alluded to, although it has been reported
that the frigate docked with the permission of the junta, Koromah nor the RUF
promised that Nigerian troops would not be attacked, if upon landing they
demonstrated an offensive military posture.
Unlike Charles Taylor, after the junta seized power, Koromah predicted
that ECOWAS may take unilateral humanitarian action to restore law and
order, and appealed to the United Nations to forestall or dissuade ECOWAS
from intervening.' Koromah's pre-intervention appeal shows that more likely
than not he was aware that there was a legitimate basis for intervention, which
may elucidate why he did not frustrate the ECOMOG mission in August of the
same year. In contrast, Koromah and the RUF may have thwarted the Nigerian
operation because they considered it illegitimate. Likewise, as previously stated,
Taylor's NPFL appear to have attacked ECOMOG forces because they believed
that the intervention was illegal. Hence at a minimum, it is evident that
ECOWAS was obligated to proffer Taylor an explanation as to the legality of
intervention, and alternatively why they were not beholden to do so in the case
of Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding, both cases reveal that if a permanent preintervention trust-building were established to validate ECOWAS style
interventions, violence between peace enforcers and combatants may be averted
when troops are deployed in conflict scenarios.
B.

Resource Capacity

Regardless of the degree of legitimacy a proposed humanitarian
enforcement mission may have, unless peace enforcers have the material

62
63

African Research Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 5, May 1-31, 1997, p. 12694 (italics added).
African Research Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 12694-5.
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resources to viably carry out an operation, it will more likely than not fail. An
under-resourced enforcement operation not only threatens the object and
purpose of a mission, but also puts at risk individual humanitarian enforcers
and civilians, and encourages participant troop corruption. As a result, a
conflict scenario may be exacerbated or additional conflict stimulated by a
poorly financed operation.
Neither the Liberian nor Sierra Leonian interventions were exact
operational successes due to the negligible amount of resources that the
member states of ECOWAS (with exception to Nigeria) contributed to those
missions. Nigeria provided over 70 percent of the troops for each operation and
for the most part financed them." Nevertheless, Nigerian arrogance, poor preintervention intelligence gathering, and a lack of logistical support and
reconnaissance capacity hindered and compromised both missions.
A comprehensive economic feasibility study based on data compiled
from target state survey missions would allow states to determine the likely
operational costs of intervention. If such data were to be provided to member
states in the pre-intervention planning phase of an operation, they would be in
a better position to determine whether the necessary resources exist to
adequately finance a mission. A coherently planned operation, which includes
an assessment of the resource capacity of contributing states is likely to
decrease confusion, increase transparency and promote trust amongst the
relevant parties to a conflict. This is especially important with respect to
contributing member states, who as a result of such an assessment will know
exactly what resources other states intend to proffer. This will increase
accountability by obliging the former to work with the latter to raise the
necessary assets. Most important, however, such information should be made
available to the government of a target state and combatants, so that they know
in advance the extent to which states are willing to go to resolve a conflict. In
this sense, pre-intervention transparency may positively affect the nature of an
operation as combatants may be deterred from fighting if they are aware that
the intervention has regional or international legitimacy, and that continued

64
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hostilities may result in them being confronted by a conventional humanitarian
force. Likewise, if the relevant parties are informed as to the material resources
states are willing to expend to resolve a conflict, a mission may attain
additional legitimacy from the combatants and simultaneously deter them from
warring. For example, had Charles Taylor been "informed" that Nigeria was
willing to invest vast resources (several billion dollars) to avert further carnage
in Liberia, he may not have been so hostile toward the ECOMOG, and more
apt to work toward resolving the conflict. Either he would have been hesitant
to prolong the war knowing the tangible and intangible resources (military
equipment, monies and human lives) ECOWAS was willing to expend to
enforce the peace, or alternatively, the mission may have obtained legitimacy
from Taylor had he been aware of the capital ECOWAS was willing to invest
to secure peace.
Yet still, the ECOMOG mission in Liberia was greatly compromised
because the ECOWAS lacked the necessary resources to maintain the
ECOMOG in Liberia for seven years. Herbert Howe reports that
"ECOMOG...lacked much of the equipment, maintenance, manpower,
administration, and intelligence required for counterinsurgency in Liberia."'
To undertake a humanitarian enforcement mission amidst a civil war,
particularly in a state that has topography similar to Liberia, the intervenor
must have at its disposal helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft. However,
ECOMOG sought to enforce the peace in Liberia with neither. From a technical
standpoint, incompatibility of military equipment, poor maintenance and a lack
of operable communications equipment frustrated the mission. ECOMOG's
fluctuating manpower base, weak command and control apparatus and lack of
a viable intelligence gathering mechanism also caused major problems. In
addition, its inability to ensure that troops received their wages in a timely
fashion may have damaged troop morale and encouraged corruption. In short,
the ECOWAS' failure to secure resources and develop a bipartisan and
comprehensive pre-intervention scheme, contributed to the exacerbation of the
conflict and the prolonging of the war.

ss
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As previously stated, had the ECOWAS conducted a comprehensive
technical survey mission detailing the material resources needed to effectively
carry out the mission, it may have increased transparency and decreased the
amount of distrust amongst its member states and between them and the NPFL.
Likewise, it may have prevented hundreds of African humanitarian enforcers,
combatants and civilians from being killed.
Although the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone encountered some
difficulties, it was enormously more successful than the one in Liberia. This
may be attributed to the above mentioned pre-intervention trust-building
mechanisms that were instituted in wake of the Liberian experience. Moreover,
this could also be because Nigerian forces were already in Sierra Leone before
the coup d' etat pursuant to a bilateral Status of the Forces Agreement between
the two countries," and since ECOMOG maintained a small-scale military
base there for operations in Liberia. Prior to the ECOMOG intervention it was
evident that the necessary manpower (albeit unorganised) existed to quickly
engage and subdue the junta.
It is probable that the ECOMOG mission was successful because its
commanders learned from the blunders of the Nigeria intervention. For
example, after Nigeria (not ECOMOG) unilaterally deployed troops to Sierra
Leone to restore law and order, they came under attack by guerrillas from the
junta and RUF.' Since Nigerian contingents were not provided with the
necessary equipment (specifically ammunition) to enable them to repel the
RUF, dozens of Nigerians were murdered and the mission commander was
forced to halt the operation until reinforcements arrived." New African
reported that the Nigerians "with their array of modern weapons backed by
frigates and all, were no match for the battle-hardened boys and girls of the
RUF who had six years to test their reflexes in the bush."9 By the time
ECOMOG forces "officially" landed in September 1997, Nigeria SOFA and
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Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), supra note 34.
New African, "Sierra Leone: RUF Comes Town", (July/August 1997), p. 16.
68 African Research Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 6, June 1-30, 1997, p. 12733.
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ECOMOG Nigerian forces already present in Sierra Leone had established the
necessary conditions for an "incident free" intervention. Similarly, the
ECOMOG forces landed with the necessary equipment to enforce the peace and
restore law and order to Sierra Leone. Although the mission can be referenced
as an operational success in comparison to the one in Liberia, ECOWAS has
yet to establish a viable command and control structure. Furthermore, the
majority of the member states of ECOWAS have failed to put forth the
resources to make such operations authentically multilateral. As a result, both
interventions have had an overly intrusive Nigerian presence.
Due to the diplomatic efforts made by the ECOWAS, OAU and United
Nations between the Nigerian intervention in June 1997, and the ECOMOG
mission in September 1997, the junta and RUF were well aware of ECOWAS'
intent to mobilise the ECOMOG humanitarian force against them. Therefore,
unlike the ECOMOG mission in Liberia, the Sierra Leone mission was
transparent, as the junta unquestionably had formal notice that ECOMOG
intended to intervene.
Resource capacity and transparency are key pre-intervention trustbuilding principles. As the ECOMOG-Liberian and Nigerian-Sierra Leone
interventions demonstrate, when states seek to enforce the peace ill-prepared
and with inadequate resources, various politico-military problems will
undoubtedly occur. Likewise, when operational transparency is apparent to the
relevant parties to a conflict, the ECOMOG-Sierra Leone intervention seems
to illustrate that humanitarian enforcers will encounter less resistance from
combatants when they intervene in a state. This is not to assert that rebels will
not attack or frustrate an intervention if they are not given notice, but only that
pre-intervention transparency may give such rebels a confident expectation that
the mission is not ill-intended nor illegitimate.
C.

Sub-Regional Doctrine Formulation

The failure of the U.S.-led U.N. mission in Somalia and the Belgiumled U.N. mission in Rwanda appears to have been directly related to material
flaws in Western-based U.N. peacekeeping practices (doctrine) with respect to
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its demonstrated inapplicability and ineffectiveness in African conflict
scenarios. This may, in part, be due to the fact that such doctrine is for the
most part a byproduct of Western military experiences in the Western
Hemisphere. Moreover, such doctrine has been developed from and is a
manifestation of interstate as opposed to internal conflict situations. Hence, to
a large extent U.N. peacekeeping doctrine has been shown to be inadequate due
to the internal character and harsh brand of conflicts occurring in Africa since

the end of the cold war.
Standard or universal international peacekeeping doctrine as employed
by the OAU in Chad and initially by ECOMOG in Liberia has proven itself
ineffective and even counterproductive in the African context. As a result, there
is a need for African states to re-evaluate and re-devise such doctrine to take
into account the nature and complexities of African conflict, as the majority of
internal deadly conflicts since 1990 have required forcible military intervention.
This, however, does not mean to suggest that standard international doctrine
should be discounted, nor that one African humanitarian enforcement doctrine
can in fact be created. On the other hand, military leaders in Africa should seek
to devise African peace enforcement doctrine within the rubric of universally
accepted standards. Given Africa's enormous size and geo-political and military
diversity, it would seem feasible for states to work through pre-existing subregional arrangements to conceive humanitarian enforcement doctrine along
sub-regional lines. The ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
MISAB mission in the Central African Republic and South African (SADC)
mission in Lesotho have demonstrated that states are working through subregional mechanisms to avert conflict, and therefore should complement such
efforts by formulating doctrine based on their respective experiences.
The ECOWAS has yet to develop sub-regional peace enforcement
doctrine. Although successful, the Liberian and Sierra Leone interventions were
"ill coordinated" reactions to humanitarian crises, which from an operational
perspective could have been greatly enhanced had they been guided by
doctrine. "Failure by African states to establish an effective collective security
system" based on sub-regional African peace enforcement doctrine has affected
their capacity to effectively respond to serious humanitarian crises, and hence
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contributed to African insecurity.' African fashioned sub-regional doctrine,
as opposed to universal Western-styled doctrine, would appear to be more
applicable and acceptable to states because as previously mentioned it would
be a manifestation of their collective sub-regional experiences. To borrow an
expression from Lord David Owen, African premised doctrine may increase
states "self-discipline to be impartial" and add credibility to a humanitarian
mission and force.' The existence of such doctrine would seem to allow the
military apparatus' of states to develop familiarity with, and a vested interest
in comporting with agreed upon politico-military standards of operation.
Doctrinal familiarity may promote interorganisational transparency and
institutional trust, as participating states and perhaps conflicting parties would
become familiar with the methods and procedures in which states have
committed themselves to work.

CONCLUSION
The case of Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrate that pre-intervention
trust-building can determine post-intervention operational outcomes and the
extent to which a humanitarian enforcement mission may succeed. The
discussion above clearly shows that the ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in
Liberia was far less successful than the one in Sierra Leone due to the
negligible amount of pre-intervention trust-building that took place prior to
intervention. Legitimacy, resource capacity, doctrine formulation and
transparency are key pre-intervention trust-promoting principles that African
states need consider before partaking in peace enforcement operations. When

70 Peter Mutharika, "The Role of the United Nations Security Council in African Peace
Management: Some Proposals," Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter

1996), p. 561.
71 (Lord Owen was commenting on the need for the Security Council to be selfdisciplined and impartial before a humanitarian intervention, so as not to undermine the
credibility of the intervening force). Lord David Owen, "A Clinician's Caution: Rhetoric and
Reality," in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. ed., Preventive Diplomacy (New York, NY: Basic Books for
the Center for International Health and Cooperation, 1996), p. 317.
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a state, group of states or regional actor intend to employ military force in a
state, the above case studies suggest that pre-intervention trust-building may
decrease the chances that the relevant parties will oppose intervention, and
lessen the likelihood that combatants will violently resist an operation. If the
relevant parties to a conflict have a confident expectation that a mission which
entails the use of forces is not ill-intended nor illegitimate, then it appears from
both a political and operational standpoint that the intervention is more likely
to succeed.
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